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Abstract 
 
The role played by monetary policy in creating the conditions that culminated in the 
current crisis and the failure of the Fed’s efforts to end the credit freeze in 2008 are 
critical components of the analysis needed as a backdrop for reform.  This paper argues 
that the link between excess liquidity, the buildup in debt, the asset bubbles that debt 
created and the financial crisis that followed are outcomes of monetary as well as 
regulatory policy failures; that they reflect a substantial weakening in the Fed’s ability to 
implement countercyclical initiatives.  It argues that the effectiveness of monetary policy 
can – and must – be restored and proposes a new system of reserve management that 
assesses reserves against assets rather than deposits and applies reserve requirements to 
all segments of the financial sector.  It concludes that a change in the current system for 
implementing monetary policy is needed to end the credit crunch, address the impact of 
the current crisis on the financial sector and the economy and ensure the success of any 
fiscal stimulus that will be undertaken.       
 
 
 
Key words: Federal Reserve System, monetary policy, reserve requirements, financial 
crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After of the eruption of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the summer of 2007, 
criticisms of past and present Federal Reserve policies became more frequent.  In 
December 2007, the Fed’s belated proposals for regulating all mortgage lenders 
suggested that it was engaged in the proverbial closing of the barn door after the horses 
were out.  Why it had not thought such restrictions were needed earlier seemed evidence 
of its ideological commitment to deregulation rather than a pragmatic assessment of 
developments that could cause market disruption and systemic fragility.  
But the Fed’s ideological commitments extended beyond its failure to monitor 
and control poor lending practices and fraud.  Fed authorities also ignored ways in which 
monetary policy itself has lost the ability to stabilize financial markets and the economy 
those markets are intended to serve.  The Fed’s monetary influence weakened as it chose 
to champion deregulation and innovation and gave market forces a larger role in 
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determining credit expansion.  It paid no attention to the way that foreign capital inflows 
drove up the supply of credit and ignored the explosion in debt that unchecked credit 
expansion produced.  And, as debt soared, the Fed ignored the asset bubbles it fueled.   
Also ignored were critical changes in the structure of financial markets that 
eroded the effectiveness of monetary tools used to transmit policy initiatives to the real 
economy.  Rather than restore its ability to exert a direct influence over credit expansion 
and contraction, the Fed adhered to outdated tools and policies in ways that became 
increasingly counterproductive.  Too often its actions tended to exacerbate cyclical 
behavior in financial markets rather than exert a countercyclical influence.   
Moreover, as it’s bailout of Bear Stearns over the weekend of March 15-16, 2008 
made clear, the Fed was unprepared to face a systemic crisis. Throughout 2008, it 
struggled to act systemically, joining with the Treasury in a series of inconsistent and 
sometimes frantic improvisations.  As a result, it has become increasingly necessary to 
ask whether or not the central bank itself has contributed to instability and, if so, what can 
be done to reconstitute a constructive path for monetary policy. 
This paper argues that the effectiveness of monetary policy can – and must – be 
restored to address the impact of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and credit crunch on the 
financial sector and the economy.  It proposes a new system of reserve management that 
assesses reserves against assets rather than deposits and applies reserve requirements to 
all segments of the financial sector.  This new approach would increase the Fed’s ability 
to respond to credit  contractions or expansions because it would be implemented by 
supplying (or withdrawing) interest-free liabilities in exchange for purchases (or sales) of 
assets on the balance sheet of the financial sector.   
In a downturn, for example, purchases of assets by the central bank in exchange 
for free liabilities would more effectively accomplish what the Fed is now trying to do:  
halt asset sales that drive down prices and erode financial institutions’ capital.  Removing 
assets and providing interest-free liabilities would encourage financial institutions to 
rebalance their books by lending or expanding their holdings.   
In addition, the expansion of reserve requirements would permit all institutions to 
draw on reserve accounts held with the Fed to make payments to one another.  Restoring 
a publicly guaranteed channel for intra-systemic transactions would alleviate concerns 
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about counterparty risk and help rebuild confidence in financial markets.  Moreover, a 
supply of new liabilities at no cost emanating from the central bank would make it 
possible for individual institutions to write-off or restructure the terms of loans or 
securities and replace them with more credit-worthy assets – a new and powerful 
monetary tool that would help assuage the destructive force of the current crisis for 
borrowers as well as lenders.     
The opening section of the paper discusses how monetary policy contributed to 
asset bubbles as the excess liquidity generated by the Fed when the economy failed to 
respond to policy initiatives created incentives for leverage and rising debt levels.  The 
next section describes the changes in financial structure that have reduced the Fed’s 
leverage, impeded its ability to transmit policy initiatives to the real economy and eroded 
its stability mandate.  The third section proposes a system-wide reserve regime that 
assesses reserves against assets as a viable model for rebuilding effective transmission 
mechanisms for monetary policy.  The discussion that follows describes the changes that 
would be needed to implement such a model and describes its advantages and benefits. 
 
Part I.   Monetary Policy Paves the Road to Crisis.  
 
Liquidity, credit growth and asset bubbles:  In February 2005, Alan Greenspan – 
then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board – told the Senate Banking Committee that 
he was surprised that long-term interest rates had fallen lower than they had been when 
the Fed started raising its short-term policy rate in 2004.  He noted that there had been 
similar declines in long-term rates in Europe and other countries and concluded that, “for 
the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a 
conundrum” (Greenspan 2005). 
 For some analysts, these developments were not surprising.  They saw falling 
long-term rates as an inevitable outcome of monetary policy decisions beginning in 2000 
that had flooded US and global markets with excess liquidity.  In the aftermath of the 
collapse of major stock indices, the Fed had been concerned about the economy’s 
sluggish response to stimulus and the potential for deflation.  To address these concerns, 
it maintained a nominal federal funds rate of one percent from June 2003 through 2004 
by generating a continuous stream of liquidity that pushed the real rate of interest into 
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negative territory over the period.  As investors’ so-called “search for yield” intensified in 
the low interest rate environment, the unprecedented increase in the availability of 
funding spurred escalating amounts of leveraged speculation in the form of carry trades, 
where the effect of borrowing short-term at low rates is to drive down rates on the higher-
yielding, longer-term assets in which the funds are invested.  
 Excess liquidity was also reflected in two other characteristics of market 
conditions that Greenspan mentioned: narrowed risk premiums and eased credit 
standards.  In fact, what was surprising about the chairman’s testimony was his silence on 
the subject of liquidity, which is, after all, what central banks create and curb in their 
quest for price stability. 
 By contrast, the Managing Director and staff of the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS) argued in their June 2004 Annual Report that there was a direct link 
between accommodative monetary policies in the G-3 countries (the US, the euro-area 
and Japan) and mounting liquidity in global financial markets.  The report pointed to 
quantitative measures such as the monetary base, broad money and credit to the private 
sector – all of which had expanded rapidly since 1999 in a large group of countries – as 
clear evidence of exceptional liquidity growth. Moreover, in 2003 the BIS had 
specifically criticized the Fed for creating a situation in which a potential US downturn 
could become more severe due to the domestic debt build-up encouraged by monetary 
ease. It had also warned about increasing speculation, pointing to a rising volume of 
leverage in domestic and international financial systems in 2002 that was fueling the 
credit expansion.  In addition, it published research establishing a link between asset 
bubbles and excessive credit growth (BIS 2002, 2003, 2004; Borio and Lowe 2002).    
 Less than a month after Greenspan’s confession of puzzlement, a major sell-off in 
bond markets introduced a stress test for a widening circle of leveraged investors. But, 
continuing to ignore the BIS’ warnings, the Fed and other leading central banks made no 
effort to address the troubling link between excess liquidity and debt-financed 
speculation.  Indeed, that link and the even more problematic connection between 
liquidity and credit growth had seemingly slipped below their radar screens.  Oblivious to 
the final link in that chain – the asset bubbles inflated by debt – and lulled by stable 
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indicators for wholesale and consumer prices, central banks took no action to deal with 
the inflation in asset prices. 
 
  Capital flows, speculative leverage and credit expansion:  Sizable, procyclical 
capital flows played an important role in weakening the impact of changes in the policy 
rate on developments in financial markets and the real economy. As noted above, raising 
the short-term policy rate failed to halt the decline in long-term interest rates in 2004 or 
prevent a flood of new borrowing that followed in 2005 and 2006.    But the Fed’s efforts 
to implement a countercyclical strategy had already failed in earlier periods.    
During the recession in the early 1990s, for example, relatively little of the Fed’s 
large infusion of liquidity was transmitted to the real economy.  The Fed had successfully 
lowered interest rates but the search for higher yields by domestic and foreign holders of 
US assets had prompted capital outflows – mostly to Mexico - that prolonged the 
recession.  Credit growth resumed when the Fed raised interest rates in March 1994 and 
US and foreign investors returned to US assets, leaving Mexico in crisis.   
By the middle of the 1990s, the growth of cross-border carry trade strategies had 
further undermined the ability of the Fed and other central banks to expand or curtail the 
transmission of liquidity to their national economies.1  These strategies, triggered by 
interest rate differentials on assets denominated in different currencies, increased the 
amount of leveraged speculation by financial institutions and fueled yet another set of 
asset bubbles to add to the string that began in Japan in the 1980s, moved through 
emerging markets in the 1990s and started to afflict the US and other advanced 
economies at the turn of the century.  The pattern that has developed over the last two 
decades suggests that relying on changes in interest rates as the primary tool of monetary 
policy can set off procyclical capital flows that tend to reverse the intended result of the 
action taken.  As a result, monetary policy can no longer reliably perform its counter-
cyclical function – its raison d’etre - and its attempts to do so may even exacerbate 
instability.    
                                                 
1 Low interest rates in one national market provided an incentive for carry trade strategies that used 
borrowings in that currency to fund investments in higher-yielding assets denominated in other currencies. 
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Throughout 2004 and 2005, for example, borrowing reached truly massive 
proportions both in the US and abroad.  The Fed’s measured increases in policy rates had 
no cooling effect on rising debt levels.  In fact, they spurred foreign private inflows into 
dollar assets at home and abroad by encouraging carry trade strategies based on 
borrowing low interest rate yen to purchase higher yielding dollar assets. Escalating 
speculation was reflected in record-breaking growth in borrowing in external banking 
markets, the great majority of which was channeled to financial institutions and used for 
position-taking by commercial and investment banks and hedge funds (BIS 2005, 2006). 
 With capital inflows into the US in 2005 rising to twice the amount needed to 
finance the current account deficit, the US assumed an entrepot function for global 
markets.  Excess inflows into dollar assets triggered sizable outflows for investment in 
higher-yielding emerging market assets (U.S. Department of Commerce 2006).   As an 
excess of dollars from foreign investment on top of current account surpluses flooded 
their markets, central banks in those countries responded by buying dollars to brake their 
conversion into local currencies.  While their sterilized intervention strategies helped 
prevent a buildup in domestic liquidity, they also prevented the appreciation of their 
currencies.  
But, needing to invest the dollars they had acquired, emerging market countries 
bought US treasury securities and other dollar assets and re-exported the problem back to 
the US.  The accumulation of dollar reserves by these countries augmented the highly 
liquid conditions in US financial markets, exerting downward pressure on medium and 
long-term interest rates and fueling another round of capital outflows from the US back to 
emerging markets as well as a continued borrowing binge by US residents. 
 While 2005 was an extraordinary year in terms of rising liquidity and debt, the 
pattern of capital flows that it reflected was not unique to that year.  Although net foreign 
lending in US credit markets averaged about 15 percent of the annual supply of funds 
from the mid-1990s through 2007 (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds) the advent of 
monetary ease after 2001 introduced a new dynamic: the generation of liquidity through 
the spill-over effects of leveraged cross-border investment flows.  The round-robin nature 
of these flows constituted a sorcerer’s apprentice scenario that was bound to lead to crisis 
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when uncertainty - from whatever cause - threatened the highly leveraged financial 
sector’s need for funding.   
Meanwhile, the rising debt levels of private financial and non-financial sectors 
were threatening to burst the asset bubbles they had created.  The housing bubble that had 
become apparent in the US and was to burst in the second half of 2007 had been fueled 
by an extraordinary growth in debt with outstanding credit reaching 352.6 percent of 
GDP by year-end 2007, up from 255.3 percent in 1997.  The rise in household debt over 
the same decade (from 66.1 to 99.9 percent of GDP) was both a key indicator of the debt 
bubble and of the growing threat it posed for future spending as debt service took a larger 
share of disposable income.  But the most dramatic development was the jump in the debt 
of the financial sector to 113.8 percent of GDP from 63.8 percent only a decade earlier 
(Ibid.).  While the increased borrowing by financial institutions signaled rising 
speculation, it also reflected the new funding strategies adopted by a profoundly changed 
financial system.  Those changes and their implications for monetary policy 
implementation constituted another critical development the Fed ignored.   
 
Part II.  The Slipping Transmission Belt for Monetary Policy  
 
Savings shift from banks to institutional investors:  Over the past 30 years, the 
US financial system has been transformed by a shift in household savings from banks to 
pension and mutual funds and other institutional investment pools.  Between 1977 and 
year-end 2007, the assets of all depository institutions plummeted from 56.3 percent to 
23.7 percent of total financial sector assets.  Meanwhile, spurred in part by the funding 
requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, the 
assets of pension funds and mutual funds rose from 21.0 percent to 37.8 percent as these 
institutional investment pools came to provide the dominant channels for household 
saving and investment flows. 2  At yearend 2007, pension funds held $10.7 trillion of 
financial assets (including equities) and mutual funds’ holdings of money market 
instruments, stocks and bonds totaled $11.2 trillion.  By contrast, the total assets of 
                                                 
2 The combined assets of pension and mutual funds as a share of financial sector assets were actually higher 
in 1997 (42.3 percent) when pension fund assets were 25.7 percent of the total than in 2007 when pension 
funds’ holdings slipped to 18.5 percent. 
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commercial banks, savings institutions and credit unions amounted to $13.7 trillion 
(Ibid.). 
 
 Borrowing shifts to capital markets:  Since the primary assets held by 
institutional investors are securities, the shift in individual savings from banks to pension 
and mutual funds produced a symmetrical increase in business borrowing through capital 
markets. Credit flows to individuals also moved into the capital markets as mortgage 
originators such as banks and brokers bundled individual mortgages into pools and sold 
securities based on those pools to investors.  Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) - 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and federally related mortgage pools - played major roles in 
facilitating the securitization process.  Meanwhile, asset-backed securities (ABS) issuers 
used securitization techniques to fund car loans and other consumer receivables.  In the 
twenty year period between 1987 and 2007, the assets of GSEs and mortgage pools – 
primarily holdings of mortgages for single-family housing – rose from $1.0 trillion to 
$7.6 trillion while assets of ABS issuers jumped from $118.3 billion to $4.2 trillion 
(Ibid.). 
 
     The policy link to the real economy weakens:  These shifts in saving and credit 
flows have radically altered the way the financial sector functions, reducing the role of 
direct lending in favor of trading, investment and asset management.  The impact on the 
transmission of monetary policy initiatives has been profound and was already evident in 
1993.  At that time, former-Fed Chairman Greenspan noted that “the fairly direct effect 
that open market operations once had on the credit flows provided for businesses and 
home construction is largely dissipated” due to the diminished role of banks, the increase 
in savings channeled through institutional investors and the growth of securitization. 
Though Greenspan asserted that “the Federal Reserve can still affect short-term interest 
rates, and thus have an impact on the cost of borrowing from banks, from other 
intermediaries, and directly in the capital markets,” he acknowledged that “this effect 
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may be more indirect, take longer, and require larger movements in rates for a given 
effect on output” (Greenspan 1993, p.3 ). 3 
 
The shift to market-based controls:  Subsequent events have underscored the 
accuracy of these remarks. In the almost 15 years since they were made, however, the 
major central banks have taken no steps to improve the transmission mechanism.  On the 
contrary, they countenanced further innovation and deregulation and promoted the view 
that market-based solutions – the Basel Agreement on capital requirements, for example 
– could replace the quantity controls (reserve and liquidity requirements, lending limits 
and capital controls) that had been targeted for removal by the advocates of liberalization.  
In the US, reserve requirements have not been removed but they have been substantially 
lowered and were further weakened as banks replaced deposits with borrowed funds and 
used sweep accounts and other strategies to diminish the cost of holding non-interest-
bearing reserves on their balance sheets.  
As a strategy for ensuring that market forces rather than regulations and quantity 
controls would determine the volume of bank lending, capital requirements became the 
rationale for – and poster child of - deregulation. But they have subsequently been seen as 
its Achilles heel because of their focus on the individual institution rather than the system 
as a whole.  William R. White describes this “fallacy of composition” as one that can 
exacerbate a system-wide problem when recommendations for a sale of assets by one 
institution in a stressful situation could reduce prices and the value of remaining assets, 
leaving other institutions weaker (White 2007, p.83).  An additional problem is that 
markets inevitably supply more capital during a boom and less during a downturn.  As 
the BIS acknowledged in 2002, capital requirements impose a strong procyclical bias on 
bank lending.  Moreover, under Basel 2, the weightings for credit risks increase in a 
downturn – thus depressing the availability and increasing the price of credit – while the 
opposite occurs in a boom (BIS 2002).   
 
                                                 
3 During the same 1993 conference, former Bundesbank Vice President Hans Tietmeyer took a somewhat 
gloomier view, arguing that: “…changes in the financial markets have generally made it more difficult for 
monetary policymakers to fulfill their stability mandate…In a number of countries, financial innovation 
and deregulation have distorted the intermediate targets used in the conduct of monetary policy and have 
altered the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy to the real economy”(Tietmeyer 1993, p.407 ) 
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The missing monetary cushion:  But these criticisms of the Basel Accord did not 
foresee the problems that would arise for banks and non-banks in a predominantly 
market-based system in which capital is the primary cushion against systemic disruption.  
As a larger share of credit market assets became tradable instruments, the inexorable 
pressure that trading rules impose on capital when the prices of one or more assets are 
falling became glaringly apparent in 2008.  As assets are marked-to-market, losses are 
charged against capital and capital is depleted.  If holdings are leveraged, margin calls 
will accelerate the process.  In the aftermath of the Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and 
AIG collapses, evidence of the amount of leverage in the system – including derivatives 
and banks’ other off balance sheet positions in special investment vehicles – was a clear 
indication that the Fed’s strategies for providing liquidity would not suffice to moderate 
the ongoing pressure on asset prices or stem the erosion of capital.  
As early as 2002 there could be no doubt that the Fed’s ability to effectively 
mount a countercyclical monetary initiative – the truly monumental contribution to 
macroeconomic policy that the Fed itself had initiated in the first half of the 20th century 
(D’Arista 1994) – was on the ropes.  In 1913, the boom and bust behavior of the financial 
sector had galvanized the political will to overcome the objections of bankers by creating 
a Federal Reserve System to hold the pool of reserves needed to cushion the banking 
system and the economy.  By 1951 – a time when depository institutions held 65 percent 
of financial sector assets and liabilities – reserve balances accounted for 11.3 percent of 
bank deposits and amounted to a remarkably comfortable cushion for the financial system 
that contributed to the financial and economic stability the US enjoyed through the mid-
1960s (Federal Reserve Flow of Funds).     
By year-end 2001, however, reserve balances had shrunk to 0.2 percent of 
deposits and banks’ share of total financial assets and liabilities had fallen to less than 
half that of the 1950s (Ibid.).   Both the disappearance of banks’ financial hegemony and 
the virtual disappearance of their reserve balances indicate the extent of the erosion of the 
Fed’s ability to exert a direct effect on bank credit and on credit growth through other, 
now dominant, channels.  The loss of a direct impact on credit has, in turn, removed the 
leverage the Fed needs for effective countercyclical strategies.  
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Meanwhile, the reintroduction of a deregulated, procyclical financial system 
under pressure from bankers in the final decades of the 20th century resulted in a still-
unfolding financial crisis that is testing the ability of the Fed to prevent a substantial 
depletion in financial sector capital.  As the stresses generated by the crisis spilled over 
into the balance sheets of institutional investors, businesses and households, potential 
sources for augmenting capital narrowed.  Thus the Treasury’s decision to use funds from 
the TARP program to supply additional capital to banks set off a stampede of conversions 
by nonbanks into bank holding companies.  
 But the focus on rebuilding capital overlooked the fact that, unless the Fed’s 
infusions of liquidity begin to restore confidence and restart the flow of credit, the 
meltdown in the capital of the financial system is likely to continue, taking the Treasury’s 
(and taxpayers’) preferred stock with it.  What is needed is a countercyclical cushion like 
the one reserves provided – a cushion that can be inflated and deflated through the 
monetary channel.  The Fed’s inability to rebuild an effective cushion of liquidity to 
protect capital has intensified the problem.  
 
Part III.  Restoring Counter-cyclical Financial and Monetary Strategies 
 
The BIS agenda:  In its June 2005 Annual Report, the BIS proposed a new 
framework for macroprudential stabilization that strongly endorsed countercyclical 
techniques to implement both regulatory and monetary policies.  The proposed 
framework would reintroduce quantitative measures such as liquidity requirements, loan-
to-value ratios, collateral requirements, margin requirements and tighter repayment 
periods.4  It would also set prudential norms relating to the growth in credit or asset 
prices and, as BIS economist William R. White argued, “… use monetary and credit data 
as a basis for resisting financial excesses in general, rather than inflationary pressure in 
particular” (White 2007, p. 81).5   
                                                 
4 This is a far more sweeping proposal than the modest one belatedly proposed for mortgage lenders by the 
Fed in December 2007 (Andrews 2007). 
5  White viewed the policy environment at that time as an intellectual turning point and candidly described 
the professional, institutional and political obstacles to reform on the scale the BIS recommended (White 
2007). 
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 This is an ambitious and admirable agenda that represents a 180 degree turn away 
from the deregulatory and inflation-targeting practices put in place over the two decades 
following the rise of free market ideology.  But, as a proposal to reinstate effective 
countercyclical strategies, it falls short of what is needed.  The quantitative measures it 
recommends would apply only to banks and not to other financial sectors.  Moreover, 
these mechanisms deal mainly with credit standards governing loans to nonfinancial 
borrowers, not their financial counterparts.  They therefore ignore the distinctive systemic 
issues and threats that have emerged as a result of changes in financial structure: the rapid 
growth and enhanced role of sectors other than banking in channeling savings and credit; 
the extensive linkages among all financial sectors that result from changes in funding 
strategies; increased leverage and the use of derivatives to hedge positions; and the 
proliferation of nonpublic, opaque markets that operate without on-time information 
about the price of transactions and the volume of trading.   A new policy framework must 
take into account all these developments in order to be effective. 
  
An alternative, systemic approach:  No plausible scenario suggests the likelihood 
of banks regaining their once-hegemonic role in credit creation.  And no likely series of 
events promises to diminish substantially the influence of institutional investment pools 
and capital flows on credit expansion.  As a result, any practical effort to rebuild effective 
countercyclical financial and monetary strategies must establish new channels for 
exercising monetary and regulatory control over all financial institutions.  Simply put, 
banks alone can no longer shoulder the transmission-belt function that links the financial 
and real sectors of the economy and nonbank financial firms cannot participate 
meaningfully in transmitting policy initiatives unless they too come under the direct 
influence of the central bank.   
 How might such a system be inaugurated?  The Fed’s sweeping inclusion of all 
mortgage lenders, state or federally regulated, under the proposed regulations it issued in 
December 2007 is an important precedent for introducing system-wide requirements and 
one that acknowledges that omitting any institutional segment would vitiate the intent of 
its action (Andrews 2007).  A systemic approach could use the 1999 Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act’s definition of activities deemed financial in nature and apply the same 
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regulatory and monetary strategies to all entities engaged in a given function to moderate 
the rise and fall in credit growth.6  The first step would be to extend the influence of the 
central bank to the entire financial system by imposing reserve requirements on all 
sectors and institutions. 
 
Create a reserve system that targets changes in assets, not liabilities:  Bringing 
non-depository institutions under the Fed’s monetary control demands significant 
adjustments to a reserve structure tailored to fit banks’ unique role in the financial 
system.  Despite their growing dominance in channeling credit, nonbank financial 
intermediaries are not designed to engage in money creation.  Unlike banks, they do not 
create new liabilities for customers when they make loans or add assets.  Moreover, the 
liabilities of institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies are in 
longer-term contracts, rendering reserve requirements on those liabilities impractical.  In 
short, the current liability-based system doesn’t permit central banks to create and 
extinguish reserves for nonbank financial firms. 
 While the proposal outlined here differs from earlier strategies that target assets, 
the concept of holding reserves against assets is not new.7  Thomas Palley provides a full 
exploration of the advantages of asset-based reserve requirements as a tool of 
stabilization policy and points out that the concept actually embodies a range of real-
world experiences, including the current model for US insurance regulation (Palley 2000, 
2003).8  Moreover, the liquidity requirements proposed by the BIS and suggestions that 
margin requirements be extended to assets other than equities are also examples of 
quantitative monetary tools that target assets. 
 The experience of European countries during the Bretton Woods era provides 
additional examples of asset-based reserve systems - some designed to control overall 
                                                 
6 Requirements needed to implement those strategies would be imposed only on those portions of a 
company engaged in financial activities but not those portions conducting nonfinancial operations.  
Drawing this distinction would strengthen the crucial separation between banking and commerce and 
prevent commercial entities from making emergency liquidity claims on the lender of last resort. 
7 For other discussions of asset-based reserve requirements, see Thurow (1972), Pollin  (1993) and D’Arista 
and Schlesinger (1993). 
8 Although reserves are imposed on insurance companies for soundness purposes (as opposed to conducting 
monetary policy) and are held by the firms themselves (rather than a public agency), they nonetheless 
illustrate the feasibility of systematically reserving and classifying institutional investors’ assets 
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credit expansion, others to shield key sectors from cyclical excesses and drought,9  and 
still others to increase credit flows to privileged sectors. And as recently as 1979, the 
Federal Reserve imposed reserve requirements on loans by US banks’ foreign branches to 
their home offices to restrain the run-up in domestic credit fueled by this source of 
funding. 
 When applied to nonbank financial institutions, these earlier asset-based reserve 
systems were used to implement allocative strategies.  They required nonbanks to hold 
reserves on the asset side of their balance sheets as banks do now.  Non-interest-bearing 
reserves could be turned into interest-earning assets by nonbanks only if they were loans 
to privileged sectors (housing, exports, tourism).  If they did not lend to privileged 
sectors, nonbanks had to hold the reserves as non-interest-bearing loans to the central 
bank. 
 Asset-based reserve strategies intended to expand or restrain credit growth were 
usually applied to banks. In the case of US banks’ borrowings from their foreign 
branches, the reserve requirements were not effective in restraining credit growth since 
they could not cover loans from the home offices of foreign banks to their US branches.  
Nevertheless, these strategies were generally effective within national economies in 
earlier periods and might even have been effective in the US in cases where bank credit 
fueled the bubble.  For example, imposing asset-based reserve requirements on banks’ 
commercial real estate loans in the late 1980s when such loans were rising by over 20 
percent a year in New England banks might have prevented the collapse in values that 
followed.   
In the late 1990s, however, asset-based reserve requirements could not be used to 
defuse the bubble in high tech stocks without imposing reserves on nonbanks since banks 
do not hold equities on their balance sheets.  Moreover, this strategy could not have 
defused the subsequent bubble in housing if it had not been applied to all financial 
institutions. By that time, securitization had distributed mortgage lending across the 
                                                 
9 For example, Sweden required all financial sectors to hold a given percentage of their total portfolio in 
housing-related assets.  Institutions that did not make real estate loans could meet the requirements by 
purchasing the liabilities of institutions that did.  Financial firms that failed to meet the required percentage 
had to enter the shortfall on their balance sheet as reserves thereby making an interest-free loan to the 
government rather than an interest-earning loan for housing.  Similar strategies for other purposes were 
used by the Netherlands, the Bank of England, Italy, Switzerland and France (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 1972, 1976).   
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entire financial system.  Raising reserve requirements on banks’ holdings of mortgage-
backed securities and mortgage related derivatives would have merely shifted sales of 
these assets to other investors. 
 In any event, industry resistance and pressures for deregulation had already 
doomed these earlier asset-based approaches and the many changes that have occurred in 
financial markets since the 1970s make it unlikely that those models would fit the current 
institutional framework.  Nevertheless, no other models offer more promising paths for 
modernizing the Fed’s policy tools today.  Only by targeting financial firms’ assets can a 
reserve system hope to effectively influence a majority of total credit extended to 
nonfinancial and financial borrowers and ensure greater balance in the distribution of 
credit across the business cycle.   
 
Make reserves liabilities, not assets: Creating a reserve system that extends the 
Fed’s influence over the financial system as a whole requires that reserves be issued to 
and held by financial institutions as liabilities to the central bank.   Shifting reserves to 
the liability side of financial institutions’ balance sheets would permit the monetary 
authority to create and extinguish reserves for both bank and nonbank financial firms.  By 
contrast, the attempt to extend reserve requirements to nonbank institutions under the old 
framework – with reserves held on the asset side of the balance sheet - would, in fact, 
have procyclical effects.  
For example, if the Fed’s objective were to augment the supply of reserves, 
adding reserves on the asset side of a mutual fund’s balance sheet would require it to 
balance its position by adding liabilities.  Because, unlike a bank, it can’t create 
liabilities, the mutual fund would have to sell additional shares to customers.  If unable to 
attract additional shareholders, it would have to sell a commensurate amount of assets or 
sell its reserves to another institution – responses that could either defeat or reduce the 
expansionary intent of the action.  Similarly, if the Fed were attempting to restrain an 
expansion by extinguishing reserves, the effect on the mutual fund would be to reduce its 
overall holdings of assets, providing an incentive to buy assets to balance an unchanged 
liability position – again, defeating the Fed’s objective.   
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In short, using the old asset-based reserve requirement framework developed in 
the era of bank-based systems would work only as an allocative strategy.  It could be 
introduced as a special intervention to stimulate credit flows to a sector under stress or to 
defuse bubbles.  It might also be used to reduce excessive leverage within the financial 
system.  But as a tool to maintain financial stability on an ongoing basis or to implement 
countercyclical policies, requiring nonbank financial institutions to hold reserves on the 
asset side of their balance sheets would undercut the effort to strengthen the monetary 
authority’s systemic influence by extending reserve requirements to all financial sectors. 
   
Employ repurchase agreements as the central bank’s primary operating tool 
and expand the Fed’s eligible holdings.  Repurchase agreements (repos) allow both the 
central bank and private financial institutions to buy an asset with an agreement to resell 
it in a given amount of time.   They are an old and proven tool of monetary policy - used 
by the Fed in transactions with primary dealers since the 1920s - and are ideally 
structured to allow the Fed to interact with all financial firms on the asset side of their 
balance sheets in assessing reserve requirements against a broad universe of financial 
assets. Under the proposed system-wide reserve regime, for example, the Fed could use 
repos to buy loans, mortgages, commercial paper, government or agency securities or 
corporate bonds from any of the many institutions that hold these assets – commercial 
and investment banks, mutual and pension funds, insurance and finance companies, or 
government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). 
 While the Fed has already expanded the range of assets it buys or lends against in 
implementing its recent crisis-management strategies, authorizing it to accept a wide 
variety of sound assets as backing for repurchase agreements10 would bring the US 
central bank closer to the successful practices of other central banks and enable it to 
                                                 
10 A proposal to broaden the portfolio of assets eligible for purchase by the Fed was offered by former Fed 
Chairman Marriner S. Eccles during hearings on the Banking Act of 1935.  He argued that the Fed should 
be free to buy “any sound asset” (Eccles 1935, p. 194).  Then as now it would eliminate the central bank’s 
need to own a vast amount of Treasury securities.  A large stockpile of Treasuries held as backing for 
reserves and outstanding currency and the even larger holdings of foreign central banks tend to restrict the 
availability of this risk-free, highly liquid asset for use in private transactions where it is needed as 
collateral and to support market stability.  In the reserve management system proposed here, the Fed could 
still acquire Treasuries, support Treasury auctions and the market for government securities while releasing 
a substantial portion of its current holdings for purchase by investors and financial institutions seeking the 
ultimate safe-haven asset. 
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exercise monetary control over a much larger assortment of assets than the shrinking 
universe of reservable deposits that now constitutes its lever for direct influence over 
credit growth.  More importantly, authority to conduct repos in any sound asset would 
strengthen the Fed’s ability to halt runs, moderate crises and curb excessive investment 
across the entire financial system.  It would, in short, restore the Fed’s ability to function 
as a systemic lender of last resort as it did when banks were the dominant lenders in credit 
markets. 
 
Part IV Implementing an Asset-Based Operating System 
 
 Implementing an asset-based reserve system would require balance-sheet 
adjustments for financial firms and the Federal Reserve and changes in the conduct of 
policy.  Figures 1-4 and the accompanying text summarize balance-sheet categories and 
open market operations under the current reserve system (in which reserves are assessed 
against bank deposits) and explain how the proposed system (in which reserves are 
assessed against the assets of all financial institutions) would make policy 
implementation more effective. 
 
  Balance sheet changes.  Moving to a system of reserve management that 
assesses reserves against assets and creates and extinguishes liabilities held as reserves 
will necessarily involve balance-sheet changes for both financial firms and the Fed. 
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show how reserves are booked on the balance sheets of banks and 
other depository institutions and on the Fed’s balance sheet under the current bank-based 
reserve management system.  As discussed, they are carried as assets of depository 
institutions and liabilities of the Fed.      
 
 
Figure 1(a):  Current Balance Sheet Structures 
Depository Institutions                                        
Assets Liabilities 
Reserves Deposits 
Loans Capital 
Other Other 
 
                                                                                   
Figure 1(b):  Current Balance Sheet Structures 
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Federal Reserve System 
Assets Liabilities 
Government securities Currency in circulation 
Repurchase agreements Bank reserves 
Discounts Government deposits 
Foreign exchange reserves Other 
  
 
Under the proposed system of universally applied reserve requirements, shown in 
Figure 2(a), financial institutions would book reserves on the liability side of their 
balance sheets rather than on the asset side.  Shifting reserves from one side of their 
balance sheet to the other would have important consequences for banks.  And booking 
reserves as liabilities would have implications for the broader financial industry as well.   
First, defining reserves as liabilities to the Fed would clarify and make explicit the 
fact that reserves represent the financial sector’s obligation to serve as a transmission belt 
for policy initiatives intended to affect economic activity.11  Second, recognizing reserves 
as liabilities would moot the contentious issue of paying interest on reserves – removing a 
long-standing sore point for depository institutions while eliminating the expense for 
taxpayers that was approved in 2008.12  Finally, defining reserves as financial sector 
liabilities would eliminate the use of sweep accounts to reduce reserve requirements on 
demand deposits and bank’s use of vault cash as a substitute for reserve accounts with the 
Fed.  Cash holdings are assets, not liabilities.  As such, they represent one component of  
 
Figure 2(a):  Balance Sheet Structures Using Asset Based Reserve Requirements 
                                                 
11 Defining reserves as liabilities to the Fed would finally, if belatedly, achieve a fuller measure of 
consistency between the central bank’s balance sheet and its actual operations.  During the drafting of the 
Federal Reserve Act, lawmakers forged a political compromise with the banking industry that made the 
new monetary authority appear to be nothing more than a bankers’ bank – a repository for the reserves 
banks would pay into the system as a safeguard in the event of future financial panics.  In this conceptual 
framework, reserves could legitimately be viewed as a passive type of central bank liability. 
Soon after the Fed’s establishment, however, the invention of open market operations gave the 
System the ability to create reserves and exercise a level of influence on financial markets and economic 
activity not envisioned when the legislation was enacted.  Later, the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, the 
Employment Act of 1946, and the Humphrey Hawkins Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 
1978 fully recognized and ratified this influence.  Nevertheless, the Fed has maintained a set of 
bookkeeping arrangements that continue to treat its assets and liabilities like those of a mere bankers’ bank.  
Defining financial sector reserves as assets of the central bank would modernize these outdated 
arrangements by confirming that: a) the Fed’s major function is to create and extinguish liquidity, and b) it 
enjoys the unique ability to create the reserves that accomplish this function.  
12 Under an asset-based reserve system, it might be argued that financial institutions should pay interest on 
reserves to the Fed.  However, policy objectives likely would be achieved more efficiently if financial firms 
simply hold reserves as non-interest-bearing liabilities to the Fed. 
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Financial Institutions      
Assets Liabilities 
Loans Deposits 
Bonds Open market paper 
Shares Loans 
Mortgages Bonds 
Treasuries Shares 
Open market paper Mortgages 
Other securities, advances & contracts Other securities, advances & contracts 
Repos & Fed funds Repos & Fed funds 
Cash Capital  
 Reserves 
 
Figure 2(b):  Balance Sheet Structures Using Asset Based Reserve Requirements 
Federal Reserve System 
Assets Liabilities 
Financial sector reserves Notes in circulation 
 Government deposits 
 Repurchase agreements 
 Discounts 
 
 
the financial sector’s total portfolio of assets against which reserves would be held. 
 
  Such a shift in booking reserves for financial institutions would require a 
symmetrical shift in the Fed’s balance sheet.  As Figure 2(b) shows, bank reserves - now 
held on the Fed’s liability side – would be recorded on its asset side together with the 
reserves of all other financial institutions. Meanwhile, repurchase agreements and 
discounts would move from the asset to the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet to 
reflect the central bank’s liability for the private sector assets it acquires when it creates 
reserves.  Foreign exchange assets (international reserves) also would become liabilities 
rather than assets since they too would be acquired through repurchase agreements.  
Outstanding currency would remain a liability, manifesting the delegation to the Fed of 
Congress’ constitutional authority to create money and manage its value. 
As a result of this rearrangement, financial sector reserves would constitute the 
Fed’s only assets under the proposed system.  The central bank would no longer hold a 
huge portfolio of government securities as backing for Federal Reserve notes, bank 
reserves and government deposits, ending the fiction that one government obligation is 
needed as backing for another.  This would mean, however, that the Fed would no longer 
earn interest on its assets, and, with non-interest-earning reserves backing its repurchase 
agreements and discounts, the central bank would no longer have income to pay interest 
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on its purchases.  Nevertheless, the invaluable interest-free liabilities financial institutions 
would receive when they sell their assets to the central bank under repurchase agreements 
supports the argument for compensating the central bank for its role in creating liquidity 
by allowing it to receive earnings on the collateral backing those repos as private 
financial borrowers do now.13 
 
 
                                                 
13 If the Fed kept the earnings on financial assets held under repurchase agreements, that income – along 
with fees for clearing and other services – should prove sufficient for it to continue operating at or near 
current levels of expenditure.  It is highly unlikely that income from this source would be insufficient but, if 
it were, the Fed, like all other government agencies, would receive supplementary funding through the 
appropriations process.  While this might be seen as an assault on the post-WW II assumption that central 
banks must be free of political influence, that assumption should be revisited in the light of recent events 
and of the Fed’s unique role as an agency to which Congress has delegated its Constitutional 
responsibilities. 
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 Implementing policy under the current reserve management system..  Figure 3 
shows the current balance sheet changes that result for monetary policy initiatives.  As 
discussed, the Fed’s acquisition of assets (government securities, repos, discounts or 
loans) results in a symmetrical increase in bank reserves on the liability side of its 
balance sheet.  Adding reserves to the asset side of depository institutions’ balance sheet 
allows them to create new liabilities (deposits) by making loans.  Similarly, the Fed’s 
sales of assets reduce reserves and the loss of reserves on the asset side of banks’ balance 
sheets theoretically forces them to reduce deposits by selling assets.   
 
 Currently, however, depository institutions need not and do not reduce their 
overall liabilities or sell assets when they lose reserves.  They can substitute borrowings 
under repo agreements with other financial institutions for deposits and add, rather than 
subtract, assets – especially if policy rate increases attract foreign inflows that increase 
the availability of credit.  This weakening of the effect of changes in outstanding reserves 
may also result in little change in banks’ balance sheets when the Fed attempts to expand 
credit by adding reserves.  In 2008, for example, banks allowed reserves to pile up as 
sterile assets – especially after the Fed began to pay interest on them – rather than make 
loans that would create deposits.  With capital eroded by falling prices on their holdings 
of securities and on the collateral they had posted to back derivatives and other off-
balance sheet commitments and borrowings, banks had lost confidence not only in their 
counterparties, but in their ability to manage their own balance sheets to preserve capital.  
Moreover, given the need to raise $1 of new capital to back every $12 dollars of new 
loans, the fact that reserves are not subject to the weightings of capital requirements and 
that they (unlike other assets) retain their face value increased the likelihood that banks 
would begin to hoard reserves. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Current Open Market Operations 
Depository Institutions Federal Reserve System 
Asset s Liabilities Asset s Liabilities 
EXPANSION 
  1) + Government 
securities (or repos or 
discounts) 
1) + Bank reserves 
2) + Reserves    
3) + Loans 3) + Deposits   
CONTRACTION 
  1) - Government 
securities (or repos or 
discounts) 
1) - Bank reserves 
2) – Reserves    
3) – Loans 3) – Deposits   
 
 
 Implementing an expansionary policy under the proposed reserve management 
system.  To implement an expansionary policy under the proposed operating system, the 
Fed would add to reserves by engaging in a repurchase agreement with a financial 
institution.  The expansion of reserves would occur in two steps as shown in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4:  Open Market Operations Using Asset-Based Reserve Requirements          
Financial Institutions Federal Reserve System  
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities 
EXPANSION 
1000 900 (to customers, investors, lenders) 
100 reserves 
100 
reserves 
100 (cash, deposits, repos & 
discounts) 
STEP 
1 
1000 1000 100 100 
- 1 asset  + 1 reserve + 1 repo 
+ 1 repo + 1 reserve   
STEP 
2 
1000 1001 101 101 
+ 10 
assets 
+ 9 liabilities (to customers, 
investors, lenders) 
  STEP 
3 
1010 1010   
     
CONTRACTION 
1000 900 (to customers, investors, lenders) 
100 reserves 
100  
reserves 
100 (cash, deposits, repos $ 
discounts 
STEP 1 
1000 1000 100 100 
- 1 
repo 
 - 1 reserve - 1 repo 
+ 1 
asset 
- 1 reserve   
STEP 2 
1000 999 99 99 
-10 
assets 
- 9 customer liabilities   STEP 3 
990 990   
 
 
1).  The central bank buys as asset from a financial institution – for example, GE capital, 
Fannie Mae, Met Life of JP Morgan Chase – agreeing to resell the asset in a designated 
period of time.  The Fed pays for the asset by crediting the seller’s reserve account with 
its local Federal Reserve bank.  In the example depicted in Fugure 4, the Fed has added 
$1 of liabilities to its balance sheet (the repo) and created $1 of assets (financial sector 
reserves).14 
 
On the asset side of the financial institution’s balance sheet, the transaction is a wash; the 
addition of a $1 repurchase agreement offsets the sale of $1 of assets to the Fed.  
However, the repo with the Fed (unlike the asset acquired by the Fed) does not bear 
interest.  Meanwhile, on the liability side of its balance sheet, the financial institution has 
gained $1 of interest-free reserves. 
 
2). Assuming a fractional reserve requirement of ten percent, the addition of $1 of reserve 
liabilities makes it possible for the financial institution to support $10 of additional assets 
and to do so by acquiring only $9 of additional liabilities from customers. Even if it were 
unable to attract the additional liabilities from customers, the financial institution would 
need to buy $1 of assets to balance its accounts.   
 
                                                 
14 Incidental to the transaction – and therefore not shown in Figure 4 – the Fed receives interest or earnings 
on the asset it bought through the repurchase agreement. 
 23
As is the case under the current operating procedures, reserves would be distributed 
throughout the financial system by means of purchases and sales among the private 
institutions in the federal funds market.  The system may not maximize the expansionary 
potential of the reserve increase due to the voluntary nature of this process.  But the 
addition of a given amount of interest-free liabilities would provide a powerful incentive 
– nothing to lose and more earnings to gain – for financial institutions to acquire income-
producing assets and lead to a fairly predictable increase in credit.        
 
By providing this incentive, the proposed reserve management system would, as 
discussed, remedy a major flaw in the existing model.  Under the current system, the Fed 
can push on a string, creating excess reserves that aren’t used in the kind of credit crunch 
that developed during the 1990-91 recession and again in 2008.  Under the proposed 
system, string turns into stimulus.   
  In a deflationary environment, this change could prove the difference between 
recovery and prolonged recession.  With the tools available in the proposed system, the 
Fed could create reserves to encourage cancellations of non-performing debts and debt 
securities, allowing the financial sector to replace them with earning assets. This would 
channel liquidity directly to households and businesses, helping avoid the stagnation that 
develops when financial institutions resist issuing new credit and cannot cancel debt for 
troubled borrowers without jeopardizing their own survival.  By thus strengthening 
private sector balance sheets, monetary policy could powerfully reinforce fiscal 
initiatives designed to revive demand and investment. 
Implementing a contractionary policy under the proposed system.  As Figure 4 
shows, the Fed would allow repurchase agreements to mature without renewal or engage 
in reverse repurchase agreements, causing a reduction in outstanding reserves.  This 
would take place in a two step process as follows: 
1). The Fed extinguishes its liability to the seller of the repo by returning the collateral 
and debiting the financial institution’s reserve account.  Thus the central bank reduces its 
balance sheet by $1 of liabilities (repos) and $1 of assets (reserves).   
The financial institution has exchanged $1 of non-interest-bearing assets (the repo with 
the Fed) for $1 of interest-bearing assets (the collateral for the repo).  The amount of its 
assets has not changed but it has lost $1 of non-interest-bearing liabilities (the reserve 
deposit). 
 
2). The loss of a $1 reserve deposit requires the institution to sell assets equal to a given 
multiple of the fractional reserve requirement.  If the requirement is 10 percent, it must 
sell $10 of assets and reduce its liabilities to customers by $9.    
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Again, a change in the supply of reserves triggers adjustments that ripple throughout the 
financial system via the federal funds market.  At the end of the process, contraction will 
have occurred in both the total supply of credit and the value of total credit market assets. 
 
   
Implications for the conduct of policy:  Under the proposed reserve management 
system, the Fed’s method of implementing expansionary and contractionary monetary 
policies would closely parallel its current implementation process in three significant 
ways.  The central bank would continue to buy and sell financial assets in transactions 
with private financial institutions.  The Fed’s actions would still have the effect of 
simultaneously changing the amounts of its own assets and liabilities as well as those of 
private financial institutions.  Moreover, reserves would continue to be distributed 
throughout the financial system by means of purchases and sales among private 
institutions in the federal funds market.  The Fed would also continue to have the (little- 
used) power to change reserve requirements, raising or lowering the amount of reserves 
needed to back one or more (or all) classes of assets as part of either an allocative or 
stabilization strategy. 
Another aspect of current operating procedures that would remain unchanged 
would be the Fed’s ability to influence asset prices. Some have argued that the Fed does 
not and should not exert such an influence.  But the Fed’s open market operations already 
impact asset prices through changes in interest rates and liquidity, both of which trigger 
portfolio shifts that disseminate the effects throughout asset markets.  Though they do so 
indirectly and, as has been argued, sometimes with unintended results, the Fed’s interest 
rate changes exert profound effects on the value of pension fund assets, mutual fund 
shares and housing, as recent experience has shown. 
 In practice, all efforts to conduct monetary policy must take asset-price 
movements into consideration – at least at some level of the analytical or decision-
making process.  And, targeted or not, all efforts to conduct monetary policy must 
influence those price movements.  As long as the Fed’s basic objectives – sustainable 
output, low unemployment, stable prices – remain constant, it makes little philosophical 
difference whether policy transmits those influences indirectly (as in the current bank-
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centered reserve system) or directly (as in a system-wide reserve regime).  The point is to 
ensure that the process is efficient and produces the intended outcomes. 
 In practical terms, the Fed’s influence on asset markets likely would function far 
more efficiently under a system-wide reserve regime.  With all financial institutions 
holding reserves and participating in the federal funds market, volatility would decline as 
a result of those institutions making portfolio adjustments by purchasing and selling 
reserves rather than assets.  This would be particularly important in the event of market 
disruptions, when forced sales of assets increase downward pressure on prices and 
financial sector capital and threaten the ability of markets to function.  The fact that 
reserves retain their face value enhances their role as a cushion, ensuring that trades 
settled by debiting an institution’s reserve account with the Fed are accepted with 
confidence. 
 
Moderating the effects of capital Inflows and outflows:  Foreign capital inflows 
and outflows change the availability and price of credit in domestic markets. Under 
current operating procedures, the Fed does not – and cannot - directly offset the effects of 
capital flows on the supply or distribution of credit. It could only change the impact of 
capital flows if foreigners held the majority of their US investments in bank deposits 
rather than in Treasury and GSE securities, corporate bonds and stocks.   Given this 
handicap, the central bank cannot play an effective restraining role when foreign inflows 
or outflows cause substantial shifts in the issuance volume or price level of mortgage or 
corporate securities or other assets. 
 In the proposed system-wide reserve regime, using repurchase agreements as the 
principal operating tool would allow the Fed to respond more effectively to excessive 
investment or disinvestment of foreign funds in one or more US asset markets.  For 
example, allowing repos backed by holdings of the kinds of assets purchased by 
foreigners to run off and replacing them with repos in foreign assets would effectively 
mop up an inflow, leaving reserves, interest rate levels and credit conditions largely 
unchanged.  Alternatively, to counter the contractionary effects of an outflow, the Fed 
could acquire assets sold by foreign investors, increasing the amount of reserves in the 
system.  Moreover, the Fed’s ability to conduct repurchase agreements in foreign 
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securities would eliminate the central bank’s need to hold international reserves as 
precautionary investments   
The benefit of introducing such transactions would be to enhance the Fed’s ability 
to maintain stable conditions in domestic financial markets.  But increasing effective US 
intervention in foreign exchange markets would not necessarily contribute to global 
stability.  The issue of capital flows is complex and contentious.  As argued elsewhere, a 
rising volume of speculative flows in response to interest rate differentials has 
contributed to widening global imbalances in recent years with results that have 
underscored the need for international as well as national monetary reform.15  
Nevertheless, the Fed’s inability to moderate the impact of capital flows on US credit 
expansion has exacerbated the problem of global payments imbalances even as it has 
facilitated the buildup of historic levels of domestic and external debt that have weakened 
the US economy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
At the end of the day, the main purpose of reinstating quantitative policy tools is 
to improve monetary control and overall macroeconomic performance.  But a reserve 
management system that creates and extinguishes financial sector liabilities to influence 
holdings of credit-creating assets is a more efficient channel for monetary control because 
it can constrain or stimulate specific asset types or institutional sectors and thus deal more 
effectively with asset bubbles or credit crunches. 
In the case of credit crunches, for example, if financial institutions were required 
to back assets by holding reserve liabilities that hold their face value, a fall in the price of 
any asset would increase the value of reserves relative to assets and allow intermediaries 
to buy more of either the affected instruments or other assets.  Similarly, an increase in 
the value of assets without an offsetting increase in the reserve liabilities that back them 
would force sales that would limit the rate of increase in prices of one or more classes of 
assets and thus the potential for bubbles to develop. This automatic countercyclical aspect 
                                                 
15 See D’Arista 2008 for a more extensive discussion of these issues. 
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of the system would do more to moderate movements in asset prices than changes in 
interest rates or margin or capital requirements.   
 Last, but certainly not least, a system-wide reserve management regime would 
give all financial institutions direct access to the lender-of-last-resort.  For example, if 
mutual funds faced runs by shareholders, they could avoid selling assets (and thus 
prevent downward pressure on prices) by transferring assets to the Fed under repurchase 
agreements and acquiring reserves needed to offset customers’ withdrawals.   Of course, 
the Fed would, as now, act in that capacity at its own discretion.  But it would not need to 
jawbone the banks to lend to others the funds it traditionally loaned primarily to them to 
address systemic disruptions. 
 If it were bundled with complementary reforms in prudential supervision and 
regulation and a much-needed overhaul of financial sector guarantees, the comprehensive 
lender-or-last-resort facilities achievable under the proposed reserve regime would make 
the Fed’s crisis interventions more coherent, less costly and, hopefully, less necessary.  
Like the other benefits of the system proposed in this paper, this improvement in crisis-
management technique and strategy would begin forging a policy framework that can 
deal more effectively with the current crisis and rebuild a financial system that will, once 
again, promote sustainable growth.   
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